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Abstract 
Security Transaction taxes have been in place in many countries for many years now. Yet 
we do not fully know how these taxes effect prices, volumes, bid-ask spreads and 
volatility and in turn if they are good for the economy or not. This paper is an attempt to 
understand how security transaction taxes decrease volume of trading, decrease prices of 
stocks and increase bid-ask spreads. It analyses the effect the STTs implemented by the 
state and federal government in New York on June 1
st
 1905 and December 1
st
 1914 
respectively, had on the stocks of the New York Stock Exchange. These results will help 
us analyze whether future implementations of STTs will harm or benefit the market.  
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I. Introduction 
Security Transaction Taxes (STTs) are attracting a lot of interest today. This is 
because some of the member states of the European Union are implementing STTs in 
2014. Moreover the United States of America has also seen many proposals for 
implementation of STTs. The reason countries in general want to implement STTs, is 
because it is a good source of revenue. The governments of these countries have a budget 
deficit from bailing out insolvent financial organizations as a result of the financial crisis 
of 2007-2009. The government feels that because the financial industry is partly 
responsible for the crisis, it should pay their dues by bearing the cost of STTs. However, 
because there is uncertainty about the effects these taxes have on the economy, 
governments are hesitant in implementing these taxes.  
Even though there is a dearth of evidence on the effects of these taxes, there have 
been some theoretical and empirical studies in this field. Fortunately, historically we have 
a natural experiment which can help us study the effects of STTs. In 1905 the state of 
New York implemented a state STT of 2 basis points per 100$ of par value. In 1914 the 
US government implemented a federal tax of 2 basis points per 100$ of par value. This 
raised the total STT in New York to 4 basis points per 100$ of par value in 1914. This 
paper uses this natural financial experiment to analyze the effect of STT on the economy. 
This paper looks specifically at the effect the STT imposed on 1
st
 June 1905 and 
1
st
 December 1914 in New York City, has on volume, prices and bid- ask spreads. It 
looks at the monthly change in volume, price, bid-ask spread and bid-ask percent to see 
the direction these variables change in because of the tax. It also calculates whether these 
changes are statistically significant.  
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After analyzing the above observations it was found that price and bid-ask spreads 
move in the opposite direction as proposed in the hypothesis. The paper hypothesis that 
volumes and prices should decrease, while bid-ask spreads should increase as a result of 
STTs. However, analysis of the experiment shows that price tends to increase when it 
should decrease, while bid-ask spreads tend to decrease when it should increase. 
Moreover, these changes are not statistically significant. Volume is seen to mostly 
decrease. This agrees with the proposed hypothesis. There are some statistically 
significant changes in volume, price and bid-ask spreads that take place months before 
and after the implementation of the tax. In general there is no specific trend seen after the 
implementation of the tax, with prices and bid-ask spread being very volatile in the 
months before and after the tax.  
The following section of this paper is section II on the Literature Review. It looks 
at the background of STTs and recent news about their implementation in the European 
Union. This section also looks into the history of STTs in United States of America and 
elaborates some existing theoretical and empirical work on the effects of STTs on the 
economy. Section III lays down the hypothesis and the reasons for these claims. It then 
talks about the model used for the experiment. Section IV describes the data and 
methodology. Section V contains the results while section VI discusses the meaning of 
these results. Section VII lays down the conclusion.  
 
 
 
3 
 
II. Literature Review 
Securities Transaction tax, is a tax imposed on the purchase and sale of securities. 
This tax could apply to stocks, bonds, derivative instruments, mutual funds, exchange-
traded funds (ETFs) and other securities. Sometimes STTs can be specific and apply to 
transaction involving certain securities like stocks and derivatives but not bonds and 
mutual funds. Other times STTs can be specific in terms of the type of traders it applies 
to. It can apply to all traders, or be limited to institutional traders while not including 
individual traders. This tax has been around for a long time and has been implemented in 
many countries. Currently at least 29 countries-including Australia, Brazil, China, 
France, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan and 
the United Kingdom - have some form of STT. 
The most recent news in the field of STTs is about the European Union Financial 
transaction tax (EU FTT). A proposal by the European commission, will introduce FTT 
within some EU member states by 2014. This proposal imposes a 0.1% tax on equity and 
bonds and a 0.01% tax on derivative transactions. It is said that this tax has the capability 
to raise 57 billion Euros per year. It is implemented to make the financial sector pay for 
the bailouts it received during the crisis. However, this tax has been very controversial 
with the proposal failing to get unanimous support for an EU wide implementation of 
FTTs in October 2012. The European Commission allowed the use of enhanced co-
operation
1
 to implement tax in those EU member states that wanted to do so. This 
proposal supported by eleven EU members including France, Germany, Italy, Austria, 
                                                          
1
  A procedure which allows a minimum of nine EU member states to implement advanced integration or 
cooperation, without involving the other EU members as long as the majority of EU’s 27 countries give 
their permission. This is also used for divorce and patents in EU.  
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Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain was approved by the 
European Parliament in December 2012 and the Council of the European Union in 
January 2013 (Economist article- Europe’s financial-transaction tax- 23rd February 2013) 
People have different opinions about the EU FTT. Banks and businesses in 
Europe are worried that the FTT will drive share, currency and derivative trading out of 
Europe. This tax which is implemented by only eleven of the EU member states might 
have a negative impact on the whole of Europe. To partially mitigate this risk, the EU 
commission proposes to tax transaction based on issuance and residency. People are also 
worried that because the tax is not implemented all over Europe it might drive trading to 
member states outside the eleven EU member states involved. UK already imposes a 
stamp tax on its traders since 1694 and maybe this FTT will help improve trading in UK. 
Sweden levied a FTT in the 1980’s which led to 60% of its trading volume moving to 
London. This tax was repealed in 1991. Being a firsthand witness to the movement of 
stock market trade outside its country, Sweden cautioned against the implementation of 
the EU FTT. Moreover, it is said that this tax may have a global effect also. Many 
countries including USA buy and sell stocks and bonds in European markets and engage 
in business with European banks. Many people think that the best solution to this 
problem is a global STT. (The Guardian: EU approves financial transaction tax for 11 
eurozone countries-22
nd
 January 2013) 
STT have been around for a long time. The oldest FTT that is still in existence is 
the stamp duty put on the London stock exchange in 1694. During 1694, stamp duty was 
a tax paid on instruments like written documents which were given a physical stamp. 
During the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century this tax extended to many more items like newspaper, 
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playing cards, hats etc. The money collected would go to the government directly. In the 
recent years the number of goods this stamp tax covers has decreased a lot. In 1986 stamp 
duty reserve tax was imposed on shares and other securities. On 1
st
 December 2003 
stamp duty was mostly abolished apart from duty on shares and securities. Stamp duty 
land tax was introduced on the same day on land transactions  
Today, the stamp tax in UK is 50 basis points or 0.5%.  This tax has caused 
trading in UK to move to securities that are not taxed. So while trades in equities have 
decreased, trading in options and derivatives (that are not taxed) have increased. Rather 
than trading stocks of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, investors are trading 
American Depositary Receipt
2
s (ADRs). Moreover investors are using Contracts for 
Differences 
3
(CFDs) to avoid transaction tax (Investment company institute-STT) 
United States of America has also implemented STTs in the past. The state of 
New York imposed a STT in 1905, to help generate money to ease the state deficit. In the 
next eight decades the tax was revised approximately nine times with prices moving up 
and down. In 1932 the tax which was initially 2 cents on 100$ par value was doubled 
(because of the effects of the Great Depression). In March 1933 firms lowered their par 
value to less than $10 from $100, reducing tax paid by a lot. As a result, in June 1933 the 
tax was changed to per share rather than per $100 par value. In 1966, John V. Lindsay-
the mayor of New York City- raised the tax by 25%. The immediate effect was the NYSE 
threatening to move across the Hudson River to New Jersey. In the late 1970’s the tax 
started to phase out and was completely phased out in 1981. Till today, the state of New 
                                                          
2
 Securities of non-US companies that are traded on US financial markets 
3
 Contract between a buyer and a seller stating, that the seller will pay to the buyer the difference between 
the current value of the asset and its value at the time of transaction. If this difference is negative the buyer 
pays the seller 
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York collects STTs which accounts to billions of dollars but returns it to the traders 
immediately (New York Times- In Wall St. Tax, a Simple Idea but Unintended 
Consequences- 26
th
 February 2013). 
The introduction of this tax reduced the profits of traders and hence they traded 
more in an attempt to earn back their lost profits. As a result in the first month under this 
tax, the turnover rate in the New York Stock Exchange jumped from an already high 
191% in 1905 to 244% in 1905 and 240% in 1906. Shares were changing hands once 
every twenty weeks (Wall Street Journal-Why a Financial-Transaction Tax Could 
Backfire-13
th
 December 2011) 
NYC state tax 1905-1981 
4
 
Date Year Tax (dollar/ dollar of par value)  Information 
June 1st  1905 $0.02        
two cents per $100 of par value on 
stocks traded, transferred or delivered 
in NY state 
March 1st 1932 $0.04        
four cents on $100 par value of stock 
transferred in NY state on round lots. 
Tax doubled, one of the reasons 
can be the after effects of the great 
recession (1929-32) 
    P<$5 $5<P<$10 $10<P<$20 $20<P   
June 2nd  1933 $0.030 $0.040 changed to per share basis 
July 1
st
 1945 $0.010 $0.020 $0.030 $0.040 reduced for stock less than $10 
July 1
st
 1966 $0.013 $0.025 $0.038 $0.050 
25% increase.  NYSE threatened to 
move outside NY to evade tax. 
October 1st  1968 $0.013 $0.025 $0.038 $0.050 
 An amendment was made which 
capped the max tax on one trade at 
$350  
August 1st 1975 $0.016 $0.031 $0.047 $0.063 25 % surcharge 
August 1st 1978 $0.013 $0.025 $0.038 $0.050 25 % surcharge expires 
October 1st  1979 $0.009 $0.002 $0.026 $0.035 after 30% rebate 
October 1st  1980 $0.005 $0.010 $0.015 $0.020 after 60% rebate 
October 1st  1981 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 after 100% rebate 
 
                                                          
4
 Taken from: Pomeranets Anna and Daniel Weaver.  “Security Transaction Taxes and Market Quality” 
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After World War I, Civil War and Spanish-American War, the federal 
government of USA was not in a very good financial condition. To help share the 
financial burden, the federal government imposed a STT of 2 basis points per 100$ of par 
value from 1914-1965. It was increased to a range between 4 to 6 basis points from 1932 
through 1941. The tax was repealed in 1965. In 1966 the calculated STT was 0.1% on 
security issuance and 0.04% on transfer. 
Currently the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) imposes a tax of 0.224 
basis points on stock transaction under the “Section 31 fee”. The proceeds from this STT 
are used to fund the agency.  
Federal tax 1914-1966
5
 
Date Year 
Tax (dollar/ dollar of 
par value)  Information 
    P <$20 P >$20   
December 1
st
 1914 $0.020 
two cents per $100 of par value to help pay for 
the cost of US involvement in WWI 
September  1916 $0.000 tax was repealed 
December  1917 $0.020 Reinstated 
June 21
st
 1932 $0.040 $0.050 
stocks without par value where taxed on a per 
share basis 
September 20
th
 1941 $0.050 $0.060 tax increased 
January 1966 $0.000 $0.000 after 100% rebate 
          
 
Except for the presence of the small STT by the SEC, the US government has not 
implemented STTs for a long time now. However, recently a number of proposals to 
implement STTs have been proposed in the 112
th
 United States Congress. H.R 3313, H.R 
3638, H.R 5727, S.1787 and S. 2252 are proposals that want to impose a three-basis-
point fee on  non-consumer transactions involving stocks, bonds, futures, options swaps 
and credit default swaps. H.R. 1125 is another proposal that wants to impose a 1% 
                                                          
5
 Taken from: Pomeranets Anna and Daniel Weaver.  “Security Transaction Taxes and Market Quality” 
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transaction fee on all transactions in the economy not only security transactions. The 
objective of these proposals is to eliminate national debt and individual income tax.  
H.R 3313 is one of the more famous proposals. It was introduced in the House of 
Representatives by Representative Peter DeFazio and Senator Tom Harkin on November 
2
nd, 2011. This proposal is called “Wall Street Trading and Speculators Tax Act” and 
asked for a tax of 3 basis points on the purchase of a security. This is more than 10 times 
the tax that the SEC charges currently. This tax applies to stocks, notes, bonds, 
debentures, derivatives-options, futures and swaps. It exempts initial issuance, securities 
lending and debt with a fixed maturity of 100 days or less. In case of stocks, partnership 
interests and debt, the base for this tax is the fair market value of these securities. While 
in the case of derivatives, the base of this tax is the cash flow generated by the contracts. 
There have been many debates on the effect that this tax will have. Some people believe 
that this proposal like any other STT would hurt the financial markets. The tax could 
reduce volume and liquidity resulting in wider bid-ask spreads. This would also increase 
taxes on middle-class investors, depress the value of the financial asset and increase 
hedging costs. 
This is where the study of the STTs on the NYSE in 1905 and 1914 can be useful. 
Understanding the effects the 1905 and 1914 STTs had on the NYSE can help forecast 
the impact the new STT might have on the US financial markets. There are some 
differences between the proposed DeFazio-Harkin tax and the STTs of 1905 and 1914. 
The former applies to a wider range of securities while the latter applied only to stock 
transfers. From 1914 to 1958 the latter tax applied to the par value of the stock while the 
new STT will apply to the market value of the stock. A stocks par value is usually less 
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than its market value. It was only in 1959 that the older STTs applied to the stocks market 
value and became more comparable to the DeFazio/Harkin tax. Transaction costs have 
decreased a lot since 1965. Hence a STT of this magnitude would have a far greater 
impact proportionally on investments today than it had in 1914. Moreover, algorithmic 
trading
6
 which is present today was not in existence 1905. Algorithmic traders provide 
liquidity which could counteract the decreasing effect STTs have on liquidity.  
The effect of STTs on the economy is being debated since 1987. This is because 
we are not sure how these taxes effect price, volume, bid-ask spreads and volatility. 
While some argue that STT will improve the economy, others are against it, and think it 
might harm the economy. The following paragraphs state the arguments and conclusions 
of a few theoretical and empirical papers on the effect of STTs on the economy, 
particularly its effect on volume, price, bid-ask spread and volatility.  
The papers by Stiglitz (1989) and Summers and Summers (1989) consider STTs 
of a lower rate between 0.5-1% and 0.5% of the value of the transactions respectively. 
They both agree that this kind of STT can be beneficial to the economy. While both of 
them say that STTs will discourage speculative trading leading to a reduction in 
volatility, Stiglitz (1989) also mentions that STTs will not lead to an increase in spreads. 
Schwert and Seguin (1993) slightly disagree with them and say that while STTs may not 
affect volatility, they can increase bid-ask spreads. Moreover they say that STTs reduce 
volume and prices. 
The papers by Stiglitz (1989) and Summers and Summers (1989) state that STTs 
mainly affect those who buy and sell in the same day, or with a few days or weeks. These 
                                                          
6
 When trading orders are entered using an algorithm by electronic platforms. These algorithms are pre-
programmed trading instructions and may initiate the order without human interaction.  
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kinds of transactions are generally carried by noise traders. Because STTs mainly reduce 
the activity of speculators, price volatility deceases. STTs hardly affect those people who 
have long term investments. If the proportion of investors that invest in long term assets 
increase, firms will need to shift their attention from short term to long term investments. 
This reorientation of managerial focus because of STTs can help the economy.  Schwert 
and Seguin (1993) seem to have a different view on the effect of STTs on volatility. They 
say that STTs may not necessarily lead to a decrease in volatility. According to Schwert 
and Seguin (1993), STTs may not reduce price volatility because STT affects all traders 
equally. Hence it will reduce the activities of price-stabilizing, liquidity providing 
informed traders as well as the activities of noise traders.  It is not very clear whether 
STT will have a greater effect on price-stabilizing or price de-stabilizing traders. Because 
of this uncertainty, the upward or downward movement in price volatility is also 
uncertain.  
Stiglitz (1989) says that STTs may not have an effect on bid-ask spreads and 
hence may not lead to larger spreads. He says that STT may discourage some buyers and 
sellers from trading. If this effect is symmetric, it will lead to thinner markets. Because in 
thinner markets, it takes a longer time for a buyer to be matched to a seller, the market 
maker needs to buy the security and hold it till the seller arrives. The market makers need 
to be compensated for this function which includes the risk they bear and the capital 
which is tied up. Hence a STT may increase the spreads. However, Stiglitz points out that 
for stocks that are widely sold, market makers do not need to step in. Hence STTs may 
not necessarily lead to larger spreads. Schwert and Seguin (1993) have a different view 
about the effect of STTs on bid-ask spreads. They say that STTs will increase bid-ask 
11 
 
spreads. They believe that because the different components of the spread are increasing, 
the spread increases as a whole.  
Schwert and Sequin (1993) say that a tax on transaction will reduce prices. STTs 
increase the total cost of transacting in the secondary market. Because required rates of 
return are directly proportional to transacting costs, an increase in transacting cost will 
increase the required rate of return. This would thus reduce the asset price. They also say 
that more liquid and actively traded security would experience a larger drop in prices.  
According to Schwert and Sequin (1993) STTs will lead to a decrease in volume. 
This is because of three reasons. Firstly, STTs discourage trading. Secondly, this tax 
would induce distortions. Short term trades need to be rolled over often, which may be 
costly because of a STT. Hence traders might shift to long term assets. Both buyers and 
sellers would reorganize the structure and quantities of assets they hold to reduce the 
payment of taxes. Thirdly, in extreme circumstances the volume could fall to zero, if 
trading moves to a different country. 
According to Stiglitz (1989), STTs promotes economic efficiency. This is done 
through the exchange and the capital-raising functions. Just as tariffs have a negative 
effect on the exchange of goods; STTs impede the exchange of assets. However, 
inefficiency in exchange is not that big. This is because first, the proposed taxes are 
sufficiently small that the deadweight loss that is generated is negligible. Secondly, it is 
very difficult to interpret the welfare loss associated with reduced trades based on 
incorrect expectations. The second way that STTs promote market efficiency is by 
making it easier for firms to raise money. Because STT reduce volatility, buyers of stocks 
bear less risk concerning the selling price they will receive. Moreover, reducing volatility 
12 
 
also leads to better allocation of capital for firms. Firms issue more shares when their 
share value is over-valued. This investment is not socially desirable because of 
unreasonable expectations. Because STT reduce volatility the prices of stocks will not be 
over-valued and hence firms will not make undesirable investments. Unlike Summers and 
Summers (1989) and Stiglitz (1989), Schwert and Seguin say that STT will reduce 
market efficiency by raising cost of trades that take advantage of asset mispricing. It also 
leads to an increase in the cost of transacting by directly increasing transaction costs and 
indirectly increasing bid-ask spreads. This could lead to more asset mispricing. 
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III. Model 
This paper hypothesis that implementation of STTs will decrease volume, 
decrease price and increase the bid-ask spreads. The following paragraphs give reasons 
for these claims. The hypothesis relies on the logic that when spreads increase, volume 
and price decrease. As said in Amihud and Mendelson (1986), the spread between the bid 
and the ask price is a measure of illiquidity because it is the sum of the buying premium 
and the selling concession. This spread is negatively related to liquidity. As the spread 
increases, liquidity characteristics like trading volume, the number of shareholders and 
the number of market makers trading the stock decrease. Because of this negative 
relationship it makes sense to say that volume decrease as spreads increase. As spreads 
increase, price of stocks are said to fall because according to Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986) there is a positive relation between stock returns and illiquidity. When bid-ask 
spreads increase, the liquidity decreases (as mentioned in the above paragraph). This 
reduction in liquidity or increase in illiquidity increases the rate of returns, which reduce 
the price of the asset. Therefore, if bid-ask spreads increase volume and prices will both 
decrease 
The bid-ask spread can be decomposed into three parts, order processing, 
inventory risk and information asymmetry. Because the different components of the 
spread are increasing, the spread increases as a whole (Schwert and Seguin, 1993). The 
order processing cost/ clearing cost is the fixed cost the market-maker charges for trade 
execution. As the volume decreases with the implementation of STT, the number of 
transaction across which the fixed cost could be spread decreases. This leads to an 
increase in the fixed cost. The inventory risk/ inventory carrying costs are the market 
14 
 
maker’s compensation for holding on to risky assets. Equity traders use derivatives to 
hedge their risky assets. A tax of these securities will increase their cost on hedging. 
Because the cost for hedging increases, the cost of inventory risk will also increase. The 
information asymmetry represents the likelihood that a market maker is facing an 
informed trader who had superior knowledge of the assets fundamental value. If it is 
believed that STT reduces the activities of noise traders more than it reduces the activity 
of informed traders, the probability of the market maker facing an informed trader 
increases. This increases the information asymmetry element of the bid-ask spread. All 
the elements of the bid-ask spreads increase with the issuance of STTs which leads to an 
increase in the bid-ask spread.  
Other reasons for the increase in bid-ask spread can be attributed to the reduction 
in the activities of noise traders due to the implementation of STTs.  Reduction in the 
activities of noise traders leads to less market liquidity. Because markets are thinner (less 
liquid) it is difficult for buyers and seller to get matched quickly and as a result the 
market maker needs to hold on to the security. The market maker need to be compensated 
for holding on to the asset because firstly, he is using his capital which he could have 
invested elsewhere and secondly, holding on to a security is risky. This compensation to 
market makers increase bid-ask spreads. A similar event is seen in 1914 with the 
implementation of a federal tax of 2 basis points per 100$ par value. This increased the 
total tax in New York to 4 basis point per 100$ par value (this is because the state tax of 2 
basis points per 100$ par value was already present). This increase in STT, wiped out the 
profits of floor traders and as a result the number of floor traders dropped from 200 to 50 
(Meeker 1922). Floor traders are type of dealers who traded in the stock market for very 
15 
 
small and quick profits. They executed their own trade and hence did not need to pay 
commission to a broker. The increase in STT reduced the liquidity in the markets because 
the floor traders decreased significantly. This affected the specialists, who could execute 
orders either for themselves or act as stock brokers. The specialist who acted as dealers 
had the opportunity to buy more securities only to sell them at a slightly higher price 
later. This is very similar to the job of market makers today. These specialists had to take 
into account the STT and hence sold the securities for a higher price. As a result the bid-
ask spread increased.  
For this study, I follow the methodology outlined below. I have monthly data on 
volume, price, bid-ask spread and bid-ask percent for all the stocks in the NYSE for six 
months before and after the implementation of the 1905 and 1914 taxes. I sort all the 
stocks by month and then calculate the monthly average and monthly change in volume, 
price and bid-ask spread. This is done first with all the observations. Then the data set is 
refined for robustness. The same test is performed with all the data used in the first test 
but after removing the outliers. The observations which are more than three standard 
deviations away from the mean are removed to perform this test. Then the test is done 
with stocks that have been checked for outliers as well as have data for all six months. 
This removes almost half of the observations, because many stocks had data for only one 
or two months rather than for all six months. After that, the test was done with stocks that 
were checked for outliers, had data for six months as well as were present before and 
after the tax. This led to the removal of more observations. There were many stocks that 
had data for the six months before the tax but were not present after the tax or vice versa. 
This is done to prevent stocks that were present for a short period of time but had extreme 
16 
 
values to affect the analysis. It also prevents stocks that were present before the tax but 
not after the tax from skewing the results. Then I find t-statistics for the above tests to 
understand which of these changes were significant.  
I also calculate how many stocks increased or decreased after the implementation 
of both the taxes. This was done using data only for one month before and after the tax. 
These months included May 1905 and June 1905 for the June 1
st
 1905 tax and July 1914 
and January 1915 for the December 1
st
 1914 tax. The data was cleaned to include only 
those stocks that were present before and after each tax.  
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IV. Data 
The data set used for the following tables includes monthly data for volume, 
price, bid-ask spreads and bid-ask spread percentage for all the stocks on the NYSE for a 
period of six months before and after the implementation of both the taxes. For the period 
six months before and after the June 1
st
 1905 tax, I considered the months from 
December 1904 to May 1905 and the months of June 1905 to November 1905 
respectively. For the period six months before and after the December 1
st
 1914 tax, I 
considered the months of February 1914 to July 1914 and the months of January 1915 to 
June 1915 respectively. I do not look at data for the months of August 1914-December 
1914 as the NYSE was closed because of the effects of World War I that started on July 
31
st
 1914. The data set does not have volumes for all the stocks and so the analysis for the 
change in volume due to the tax might be affected. This is alright because even though 
the effect of STTs on price bid-ask spread and volatility is not known for sure. Most 
people agree that STTs reduce volume. 
The Terminology used in this paper is outlined below. The Price in the data set is 
the average of the ask closing price and the bid closing price. The Bid-ask spread is the 
difference between the ask closing price and the bid closing price. The bid-ask spread 
percentage is the difference in the ask closing price and the bid closing price divided by 
the price. The volume is the number of shares traded.  
The following paragraphs talk about the tests performed to understand the change 
in volume, price, bid-ask spread and bid-ask percent. For table 1a and 1b, data for six 
months before and after the tax was used as it is, without deleting any stock. The monthly 
average and change in volume, price and bid-ask spread was calculated. There are 1502 
18 
 
and 1479 observations for the six month period before and after the 1905 tax 
respectively. The number of observations in the six months before and after the 1914 tax 
is 1773 and 1652 respectively. The numbers that are bolded are averages and changes in 
volume, price and bid-ask spreads for the months after the tax. They have been bolded for 
the ease of identification.  
Table 1a 
Monthly averages and changes in Volume, Price and Bid-ask Spread for all stocks on the NYSE for the 
1905 tax 
  
Average 
Volume  
Change 
in 
Volume 
Average 
Price Returns 
Average 
Bid-ask 
Spread 
Change 
in spread 
Average 
Bid-ask % 
1904 December - - $80.90 - 2.87 - 0.0462934 
1905 January 6537.55 - $82.33 1.77% 2.15 -25.24% 0.0336428* 
1905 February 9871.88 51.00% $84.59 2.74% 2.11 -1.86% 0.0308768 
1905 March 4946.13*
7
 -49.90% $86.47 2.23% 2.77 31.58% 0.0355794 
1905 April 7559.48 52.84% $82.59 -4.48% 3.18 14.77% 0.0490914* 
1905 May 4302.42 -43.09% $84.65 2.49% 3.34 5.17% 0.0494432 
1905 June 3515.49 -18.29% $83.16 -1.76% 2.98 -10.88% 0.0435010 
1905 July 4482.50 27.51% $85.19 2.44% 3.14 5.37% 0.0429711 
1905 August 8984.68* 100.44% $85.12 -0.08% 2.62 -16.60% 0.0398523 
1905 
September 2573.04* -71.36% $87.77 3.11% 2.43 -7.29% 0.0330730 
1905 October 6651.30* 158.50% $86.35 -1.61% 2.33 -4.03% 0.0355981 
1905 
November 7414.18 11.47% $85.57 -0.90% 2.40 2.88% 0.0344068 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 The star indicates that the change in the volume/price/bid-ask spread or bid-ask spread percent  from the 
earlier month to this month is significant 
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Table 1b 
Monthly averages and changes in Volume, Price and Bid-ask Spread for all stocks on the NYSE for the 
1914 tax 
  
Average 
Volume  
Change 
in 
Volume 
Average 
Price 
Return 
% 
Average 
Bid-ask 
Spread 
Change 
in spread 
Average 
Bid-ask % 
1914 February - - $73.53 - 3.11 - 0.0639482 
1914 March - - $72.46 -1.46% 2.93 -6.04% 0.0595775 
1914 April - - $69.85 -3.60% 3.50 19.77% 0.0722078* 
1914 May - - $70.98 1.62% 3.33 -5.01% 0.0689481 
1914 June - - $72.03 1.48% 3.74 12.48% 0.0720647 
1915 July - - $63.29* -12.13% 4.69 25.31% 0.0966773* 
1915 January - - $64.39 1.73% 2.51* -46.42% 0.0739094* 
1915 February - - $62.17 -3.45% 2.97 18.34% 0.0865452 
1915 March - - $68.34 9.93% 2.29 -23.05% 0.0563669* 
1915 April - - $74.80 9.45% 2.72 18.78% 0.0486937 
1915 May - - $70.73 -5.44% 3.61* 32.86% 0.0756710* 
1915 June - - $71.44 1.01% 3.06 -15.22% 0.0679748 
 
Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for data 6 months before 1905 tax 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 783 6753.347 20949.93 5 238600 
Price 1502 83.56945 59.6422 0.875 392.25 
Bid-ask spread 1502 2.71401 5.154977 0.025 64 
Bid-ask spread % 1501 0.040663 0.063654 0.000705 0.470588 
Summary statistics for data 6 months after 1905 tax 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 798 5757.001 16359.96 5 182100 
Price 1479 85.59051 60.49272 0.8125 475 
Bid-ask spread 1479 2.639487 4.566945 0.125 57 
Bid-ask spread % 1479 0.038083 0.058814 0.000579 0.433862 
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Summary statistics for data 6 months before 1914 tax 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 0         
Price 1773 70.65302 52.91788 0.625 490 
Bid-ask spread 1773 3.53927 6.97017 0.125 85 
Bid-ask spread % 1773 0.071958 0.099332 0.000593 0.5 
Summary statistics for data 6 months after 1914 tax 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 0         
Price 1652 69.05782 52.59493 0.2955 
423.7
5 
Bid-ask spread 1652 2.885347 5.443673 0.029 80 
Bid-ask spread % 1652 0.067996 0.097224 0.000764 0.5 
 
The data set used for this table removes the outliers that were present in the earlier 
test.  The number of observations removed six months before and after the 1905 tax are 
24 and 19 respectively. While the number of observations removed before and after the 
1914 tax is 22 and 18 respectively. The observations that were significantly three 
standard deviations away from the mean were considered as outliers. 
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Table 2a 
 
Table 2b 
Monthly averages and changes in Volume, Price and Bid-ask Spread for all stocks on the NYSE for the 1914 tax 
  
Average 
Volume  
Change in 
Volume 
Average 
Price Returns 
Average 
Bid-ask 
Spread 
Change in 
spread 
Average 
Bid-ask % 
1914 February - - $72.99   2.17 - 0.0434608 
1914 March - - $70.49 -3.42% 3.70 70.66% 0.0811919 
1914 April - - $72.24 2.48% 3.21 -13.26% 0.0820083 
1914 May - - $68.36 -5.37% 3.92 21.96% 0.0723522 
1914 June - - $64.31 -5.93% 2.43 -37.94% 0.0613039 
1915 July - - $58.26* -9.41% 2.82* 16.16% 0.0835340* 
1915 January - - $71.44 22.63% 1.98* -29.88% 0.0416314* 
1915 February - - $71.08 -0.51% 2.74 38.45% 0.0597032 
1915 March - - $66.91 -5.86% 2.70* -1.33% 0.0734681* 
1915 April - - $76.93* 14.97% 2.97 9.79% 0.0581507 
1915 May - - $60.97 -20.75% 2.72* -8.46% 0.0786277* 
1915 June - - $55.91 -8.29% 2.02* -25.85% 0.0816978 
 
 
 
Monthly averages and changes in Volume, Price and Bid-ask Spread for all stocks on the NYSE for the 1905 tax 
  
Average 
Volume  
Change in 
volume 
Average 
Price Returns 
Average 
Bid-ask 
Spread 
change in 
spread 
Average Bid-
ask % 
1904 December - - $78.97 - 2.41 - 0.0438748 
1905 January 6537.55 - $81.27 2.91% 2.15 -10.78% 0.0337668* 
1905 February 9928.96 51.88% $82.10 1.02% 1.85 -14.06% 0.0299884 
1905 March 4975.73* -49.89% $81.23 -1.06% 1.97 6.62% 0.0321489 
1905 April 7656.99 53.89% $79.94 -1.59% 2.77* 40.45% 0.0468043* 
1905 May 4302.42 -43.81% $81.67 2.17% 2.84 2.53% 0.0468036 
1905 June 3515.49 -18.29% $80.70 -1.18% 2.52 -11.21% 0.0406641 
1905 July 4510.80 28.31% $81.80 1.36% 2.35 -6.63% 0.0374241 
1905 August 9043.08* 100.48% $82.90 1.35% 2.49 5.66% 0.0376541 
1905 September 2573.04* -71.55% $85.37 2.98% 2.40 -3.27% 0.0332355 
1905 October 6696.35* 160.25% $83.84 -1.80% 2.30 -4.17% 0.0357858 
1905 November 7461.03 11.42% $84.09 0.30% 2.33 1.16% 0.0343774 
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Summary statistics 
Summary statistics for data 6 months before 1905 tax 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 778 6786.916 21011.98 5 238600 
Price 1478 80.88987 54.80004 0.875 290 
Bid-ask spread 1478 2.329993 3.558681 0.025 27 
Bid-ask spread % 1478 0.038834 0.059809 0.000705 0.470588 
Summary statistics for data 6 months after 1905 tax 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 794 5782.477 16397.19 5 182100 
Price 1460 83.10933 54.4026 0.8125 282 
Bid-ask spread 1460 2.398152 3.690835 0.125 25 
Bid-ask spread % 1460 0.036638 0.055104 0.000579 0.433862 
 
Summary statistics for data 6 months before 1914 tax 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 0         
Price 1751 67.97348 46.14568 0.625 
287.
5 
Bid-ask spread 1751 3.047473 4.315096 0.125 32 
Bid-ask spread % 1751 0.070389 0.097443 0.000593 0.5 
Summary statistics for data 6 months after 1914 tax 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 0         
Price 1634 66.70862 46.23191 0.2955 242 
Bid-ask spread 1634 2.521936 3.551972 0.029 25 
Bid-ask spread % 1634 0.066743 0.095804 0.000764 0.5 
 
The data set used for this test is free from outliers and includes only those stocks 
that have data for all six months before and after the tax. There are many stocks that did 
not have data for all six months and hence a large number of observations had to be 
deleted. From the data set used in the previous table, 662 and 704 observations were 
deleted before and after the 1905 tax. 581 and 806 observations are deleted before and 
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after the 1914 tax. Almost half the data set is deleted because of stocks had missing 
information for some months.  
Table 3a 
Monthly averages and changes in Volume, Price and Bid-ask Spread for all stocks on the NYSE for the 
1905 tax 
  
Average 
Volume  
Change in 
volume 
Average 
Price Returns 
Average 
Bid-ask 
Spread 
change 
in spread 
Average 
Bid-ask % 
1904 
December - - $79.85 - 2.00 - 0.0345559 
1905 January 6237.69 - $81.18 1.68% 2.15 7.60% 0.0349499 
1905 February 6731.92 7.92% $82.87 2.08% 1.62 -25.02% 0.0266443 
1905 March 4295.79 -36.19% $83.48 0.74% 2.01 24.40% 0.0291666 
1905 April 5017.20 16.79% $80.22 -3.91% 2.20 9.56% 0.0383824 
1905 May 3260.15 -35.02% $79.90 -0.40% 2.72 23.62% 0.0470337 
1905 June 3365.17 3.22% $82.79 3.62% 2.65 -2.57% 0.0410362 
1905 July 4836.56 43.72% $83.36 0.69% 2.51 -5.34% 0.0372834 
1905 August 8652.46 78.90% $85.97 3.13% 2.66 5.87% 0.0404236 
1905 
September 2655.25* -69.31% $86.83 1.01% 2.58 -3.01% 0.0360410 
1905 October 6154.65* 131.79% $86.68 -0.18% 2.38 -7.50% 0.0353837 
1905 
November 8512.37 38.31% $86.82 0.16% 2.79 16.83% 0.0382900 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
Table 3b 
Monthly averages and changes in Volume, Price and Bid-ask Spread for all stocks on the NYSE for the 1914 
tax 
  
Average 
Volume  
Change in 
Volume 
Average 
Price Returns 
Average 
Bid-ask 
Spread 
Change 
in spread 
Average 
Bid-ask % 
1914 February - - $72.58 - 2.00 - 0.0397391 
1914 March - - $71.88 -0.97% 2.10 4.71% 0.0418981 
1914 April - - $69.53 -3.27% 2.48 18.33% 0.0511039 
1914 May - - $71.32 2.57% 2.10 -15.37% 0.0477408 
1914 June - - $70.33 -1.38% 2.38 13.09% 0.0483217 
1915 July - - $63.47 -9.76% 3.75* 57.65% 0.0808949* 
1915 January - - $60.80 -4.22% 1.65* -55.91% 0.0544427* 
1915 February - - $60.11 -1.13% 1.79 8.64% 0.0630340 
1915 March - - $63.05 4.89% 1.20* -33.20% 0.0351965* 
1915 April - - $70.19 11.32% 1.85* 54.11% 0.0401926 
1915 May - - $65.59 -6.55% 2.25 21.91% 0.0552950* 
1915 June - - $66.91 2.01% 1.76 -21.81% 0.0455662 
 
Summary statistics 
Summary statistics for data 6 months before 1905 tax 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 413 5225.167 12624.79 5 86000 
Price 816 81.25005 52.58022 6.375 248.75 
Bid-ask spread 816 2.118045 3.010067 0.125 24 
Bid-ask spread % 816 0.035122 0.052789 0.000705 0.470588 
Summary statistics for data 6 months after 1905 tax 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 402 5819.724 14924.32 25 123100 
Price 756 85.58334 56.85381 7.625 256 
Bid-ask spread 756 2.595888 3.857173 0.125 25 
Bid-ask spread % 756 0.037983 0.055585 0.000579 0.433862 
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Summary statistics for data 6 months before 1914 tax 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 0         
Price 1170 69.84519 45.95 0.6875 249.5 
Bid-ask spread 1170 2.469658 3.609462 0.125 30 
Bid-ask spread % 1170 0.051649 0.073754 0.000593 0.5 
Summary statistics for data 6 months after 1914 tax 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 0         
Price 828 64.37262 45.29722 0.3125 238.5 
Bid-ask spread 828 1.748412 2.649525 0.125 25 
Bid-ask spread % 828 0.049038 0.079917 0.000764 0.5 
 
The data set used for this table is checked for outliers. Moreover, only those 
stocks that have data for all six months as well as those that are present before and after 
the tax are taken into consideration.  There were many stocks present only before or after 
the tax and had to be removed. From the data set used in the previous table, 360 and 300 
observations were deleted before and after the 1905 tax. 516 and 174 observations are 
deleted before and after the 1914 tax.  
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Table 4a 
Monthly averages and changes in Volume, Price and Bid-ask Spread for all stocks on the NYSE for the 1905 tax 
  
Average 
Volume  
Change in 
volume 
Average 
Price Returns 
Average 
Bid-ask 
Spread 
change in 
spread 
Average Bid-
ask % 
1904 December - - 79.85 - 2.00 - 0.0345559 
1905 January 6237.69 - 81.18 1.68% 2.15 7.60% 0.0349499 
1905 February 6731.92 7.92% 82.87 2.08% 1.62 -25.02% 0.0266443 
1905 March 4295.79 -36.19% 83.48 0.74% 2.01 24.40% 0.0291666 
1905 April 5017.20 16.79% 80.22 -3.91% 2.20 9.56% 0.0383824 
1905 May 3458.54 -31.07% 84.51 5.35% 3.11 41.01% 0.0552795 
1905 June 2485.43 -28.14% 85.05 0.64% 2.66 -14.35% 0.0468204 
1905 July 4032.28 62.24% 86.26 1.42% 2.43 -8.60% 0.0400240 
1905 August 8652.46 78.90% 85.97 3.13% 2.66 5.87% 0.0404236 
1905 September 2655.25 -69.31% 86.83 1.01% 2.58 -3.01% 0.0360410 
1905 October 6154.65 131.79% 86.68 -0.18% 2.38 -7.50% 0.0353837 
1905 November 8512.37 38.31% 86.82 0.16% 2.79 16.83% 0.0382900 
 
Table 4b 
Monthly averages and changes in Volume, Price and Bid-ask Spread for all stocks on the NYSE for the 1914 
tax 
  
Average 
Volume  
Change in 
Volume 
Average 
Price Returns 
Average 
Bid-ask 
Spread 
Change in 
spread 
Average 
Bid-ask % 
1914 February - - $64.81 - 1.12 - 0.0289965 
1914 March - - $64.73 -0.12% 1.38 22.57% 0.0338316 
1914 April - - $62.44 -3.55% 1.53 11.25% 0.0360138 
1914 May - - $63.94 2.41% 1.48 -3.52% 0.0406861 
1914 June - - $62.97 -1.51% 1.60 8.54% 0.0378764 
1915 July - - $55.62 -11.68% 2.38* 48.21% 0.0648861* 
1915 January - - $60.24 8.31% 1.54* -35.14% 0.0523119 
1915 February - - $59.46 -1.29% 1.57 1.71% 0.0554226* 
1915 March - - $61.89 4.08% 1.05* -32.77% 0.0320926* 
1915 April - - $68.41 10.54% 1.57 49.29% 0.0343515 
1915 May - - $63.70 -6.89% 1.99 26.38% 0.0503484* 
1915 June - - $65.01 2.06% 1.47 -25.85% 0.0420511 
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Summary statistics 
Summary statistics for data 6 months before 1905 tax 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 224 5948.518 14927.06 5 86000 
Price 456 85.96116 58.47635 6.375 248.75 
Bid-ask spread 456 2.344463 3.049527 0.125 24 
Bid-ask spread % 456 0.040922 0.061624 0.000705 0.470588 
Summary statistics for data 6 months after 1905 tax 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 224 4729.772 13870.11 25 113000 
Price 456 86.84641 58.0498 7.625 256 
Bid-ask spread 456 2.644901 3.470108 0.125 20.5 
Bid-ask spread % 456 0.043938 0.063439 0.000579 0.433862 
 
Summary statistics for data 6 months before 1914 tax 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 0         
Price 654 62.4203 46.36545 1.5625 249.5 
Bid-ask spread 654 1.58104 2.420615 0.125 20.5 
Bid-ask spread % 654 0.040382 0.062874 0.000593 0.5 
Summary statistics for data 6 months after 1914 tax 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 0         
Price 654 63.11829 46.12188 0.3125 238.5 
Bid-ask spread 654 1.533219 2.419717 0.125 25 
Bid-ask spread % 654 0.04443 0.074273 0.000764 0.5 
 
The data set used for this table includes the observations for one month before and 
after the 1905 and 1914 tax was used. This includes the months of May 1905 and June 
1905 for the 1905 tax and the months of July 1914 and January 1915 for the 1914 tax. 
Only stocks that are present both before and after the tax were taken into consideration 
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Table 5a 
Number of stocks that increased or decreased in Volume, Price, Bid-ask spread and bid-ask spread percentage 
after the 1905 tax  
Normal stocks (Total 124) 
  increase % increase decrease % decrease 
remained 
the same 
% remained 
the same 
lacking 
in data 
Volume 18 - 33 - 7 - 66 
Price 84 67.74% 29 23.39% 11 8.87% - 
Bid-ask spread 47 37.90% 48 38.71% 29 23.39% - 
Bid-ask spread % 50 40.32% 63 50.81% 11 8.87% - 
Preferred stocks (Total 88) 
  Increase % increase Decrease % decrease Same % same 
lacking 
in data 
Volume 13 - 11   3   61 
Price 54 61.36% 26 29.55% 8 9.09% - 
Bid-ask spread 32 36.36% 36 40.91% 20 22.73% - 
Bid-ask spread % 33 37.50% 50 56.82% 5 5.68% - 
 
Table 5b 
Number of stocks that increased or decreased in Volume, Price, Bid-ask spread and bid-ask spread percentage 
after the 1914 tax  
Normal stocks (Total 126) 
  increase 
% 
increase decrease 
% 
decrease 
remained 
the same 
% 
remained 
the same 
lacking in 
data 
Volume - - - - - - - 
Price 108 85.71% 16 12.70% 2 1.59% - 
Bid-ask spread 39 30.95% 68 53.97% 19 15.08% - 
Bid-ask spread % 41 32.54% 84 66.67% 1 0.79% - 
Preferred stocks (Total 71) 
  Increase 
% 
increase Decrease 
% 
decrease Same % same 
lacking in 
data 
Volume - - - - - - - 
Price 52 73.24% 17 23.94% 2 2.82% - 
Bid-ask spread 15 21.13% 51 71.83% 5 7.04% - 
Bid-ask spread % 17 23.94% 54 76.06% 0 0.00% - 
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Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for the month of May 1905 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 115 3414.23 8163.45 15.00 40900 
Price 213 81.97 58.80852 0.88 382 
Bid-ask spread 213 3.34 5.60387 0.13 40 
Bid-ask spread % 213 0.05 0.072206 0.00 0.434783 
Summary statistics for the month of June 1905 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 105 3063.62 7472.497 10.00 41500 
Price 213 82.98 58.80281 0.88 372.5 
Bid-ask spread 213 3.03 5.423346 0.13 40 
Bid-ask spread % 213 0.04 0.063672 0.00 0.394366 
 
Summart stats for the month of July 1914 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 0         
Price 268 63.29128 47.61601 0.6875 287.5 
Bid-ask spread 268 4.691698 8.153737 0.125 85 
Bid-ask spread % 268 0.096677 0.113983 0.002413 0.5 
Summart stats for the month of January 1915 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volume 0         
Price 243 64.38861 53.11323 0.2955 418.5 
Bid-ask spread 243 2.513597 4.711778 0.029 61 
Bid-ask spread % 243 0.073909 0.10466 0.001046 0.5 
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V.  Results  
Tables 1-4, calculate the monthly average and change in the volume, price, bid-
ask spread and bid-ask percentage. In table 1a there is a drop in volume, price, bid-ask 
spread and bid-ask percent in the month after the implementation of the 1905 tax. 
However, none of these changes are statistically significant. In table 1b there is an 
increase in price and a decrease in bid-ask spread and bid-ask percent in the month after 
the 1914 tax is implemented. While the increase in price is not statistically significant the 
decrease in bid-ask spread and bid-ask percent is significant but in the opposite direction. 
The hypothesis claims that the bid-ask spread should increase, but it is decreasing in this 
case. The other changes that are statistically significant are months before or after the tax. 
In table 2a there is a drop in volume, price, bid-ask spread and bid-ask percent in 
the month after the implementation of the 1905 tax. These changes are very similar to the 
changes seen in table 1a and are not statistically significant. In table 2b there is an 
increase in price and a decrease in bid-ask spread and bid-ask percent in the month after 
the 1914 tax is implemented. These changes are in the same direction as the change seen 
in table 1b. However there seems to be a greater increase in the price and a weaker 
decrease in bid-ask spread and bid-ask percent. While the increase in price is not 
statistically significant the decrease in bid-ask spread and bid-ask percent is significant 
but in the opposite direction. The other changes that are statistically significant are 
months before or after the tax. 
In table 3a there is an increase in volume and price and a decrease in bid-ask 
spread and bid-ask percent in the month after the implementation of the 1905 tax. None 
of these changes are significant. In table 3b there is a decrease in price, bid-ask spread 
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and bid-ask percent in the month after the 1914 tax is implemented. While the decrease in 
price is not statistically significant the decrease in bid-ask spread and bid-ask percent is 
significant but in the opposite direction. The other changes that are statistically 
significant are months before or after the tax. 
In table 4a there is decrease in volume, bid-ask spread and bid-ask percent while 
the price increases slightly. None of these changes are significant. In table 4b the price 
increases while the bid-ask spread and bid-ask percent decreases. The change in the price 
and bid-ask percent is not significant, but the change in the bid-ask spread is. The other 
changes that are statistically significant are months before or after the tax. 
Section 5 shows the number of stocks that increase or decreased in volume, price, 
bid-ask spread and bid-ask percent. In table 5a the price for 67.74% of the normal stocks 
and 61.36% of the preferred stocks increase. The bid-ask spread for 38.71 % of the 
normal stocks and 40.91% of the preferred stocks decrease. There is not a very large 
difference in the number of stocks that increase or decrease for the bid-ask spread and 
bid-ask percent. There are 33 normal stocks that decrease in volume while only 11 
preferred stocks. 66 stocks have missing data, so it will not be very helpful to conclude 
the change in volume looking at this table. In table 5b the price of 85.71% of the normal 
stocks and 73.34% of the preferred stocks increase. The bid-ask spread for 53.97 % of the 
normal stocks and 71.8% of the preferred stocks decrease. The bid-ask percent for 
66.67% of the normal stocks and 76.06% of the preferred stocks decrease. 
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VI. Discussion of Results 
Most of the above tests lead to a decrease in volume, bid-ask spread and bid-ask 
percent and an increase in the price after the implementation of the tax. Only the change 
in the volume moves in the direction claimed by the hypothesis. The price and the bid-ask 
spread move in the opposite direction from the changes proposed in the hypothesis.  
After the implementation of the 1905 the volume mostly decreases (except table 
3a, where volume increases slightly). Even though the change in volume moves in the 
direction proposed in the hypothesis, none of these changes were significant. This can be 
due to the lack of data on volume for many stocks. The price decreases sometimes (table 
1a and 2a) and increases sometimes (table 3a and 4a) after the implementation of the 
1905 tax. However, the changes in price are very small and not statistically significant. 
The bid-ask spread shows a more stable trend and decreases in all tests after the 
implementation of the 1905 tax. This movement is in the opposite direction of the 
proposed change in bid-ask spread. None of these changes are significant. The price and 
bid-ask spread are very volatile and jump up and down even in the months were there 
was no change in taxes.   
After the implementation of the 1914 tax, the bid-ask spread and bid-ask percent 
decrease (the bid-ask percent is not significant in 4b). This change seems to be significant 
but in the opposite direction as proposed in the hypothesis. While the hypothesis claims 
that the price should decrease, the price increases (in most of the tables except table 3b) 
after the 1914 tax. None of these changes are significant. The data on volume for all the 
stocks around 1914 and 1915 is missing. So, the analysis in the change in the volume 
cannot be done. The price and bid-ask spreads are very volatile and jump up and down 
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even in the months were there was no tax change.  The abnormal changes in the price and 
the bid-ask spread can be attributed to the outbreak of World War I on 28
th
 July 1914, 
four months before the implementation of the STT on 1
st
 December 1914. World War I 
also led to the closing down of the NYSE for four months. These events and the months 
leading up to them were a period of uncertainty. This could be a reason for the high 
volatility seen in the price and bid-ask spread. 
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VII. Conclusion 
The effect of the tax of 1
st
 December 1914 is not a very good indicator of the 
effects of STTs in general. This is because WWI and the shutdown of NYSE were major 
events that also occurred during that period, which could affect the volume, bid-ask 
spread and price more than the STTs could. The implementation of the STT on June 1
st
 
1905 is a much better date, to study the effects of the STT. However, it is seen that the 
price and bid-ask spreads move around a lot in the months before and after the1905 tax 
also. There were many changes in federal and state taxes till 1981, which could be good 
experiments for studying the effects of STTs further.   
The 1905 and 1914 taxes did not show a very stable trend, with the changes in 
price and bid-ask spread not being big enough to be statistically significant. This may be 
because the STT was very small. I think a small tax in the range of 0.5%-1% may not 
affect prices and bid-ask spreads a lot. Hence it would be a good way to create revenue. 
The tax in 1905 was 2 basis points per 100$ of par value, which comes to be 0.02%. The 
tax in 1914 was another 2 basis points per 100$ of par value which increased the total tax 
in New York to 4 basis points per 100$ of par value. This accounts to 0.04% which is still 
smaller than 1%. Studying STTs which are 1% or greater can give a more definite change 
in price and bid-ask spreads. These studies could give a better answer to the question, 
“Do STTs help or harm the economy?” 
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